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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
ARGUMENT FOR CHOICE 
David R. Dow* 
INTRODUCTION 
Both courts and commentators have treated the abortion is-
sue primarily as a right to privacy question. In this essay I sug-
gest that legislation interfering with a woman's ability to obtain 
an abortion prior to fetal viability raises serious establishment 
clause implications. l My argument is purposefully tentative, in 
part because the idea has been resoundingly neglected by the 
Supreme Court. Indeed, beginning with its decision in Roe v. 
Wade,2 and continuing through the recent case of Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services,s the entire Court, with the excep-
tion of Justice Stevens' opinion in Webster, has ignored the per-
vasive religious aura that suffuses the abortion debate. 
Abortion is not the only area where the Court has danced 
this dance. In Griswold v. Connecticut,· when the Court held 
that Americans enjoy a constitutional right to privacy which 
permits married couples to obtain and use contraceptives, the 
Justices similarly avoided any mention of the fact that the anti-
c 1990 David R. Dow. 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. B.A., Rice Univer-
sity; M.A., Yale University; J.D., Yale Law School. For their having read earlier versions 
of this essay, I thank Sid Buchanan, Gil Finnell, John Mixon, and Craig Smyser. I am 
especially grateful to my research assistant, Sofia Adrogue, and to Ronald Mann and 
Irene Rosenberg, who read and commented extensively upon numerous of this essay's 
previous incarnations. 
1. The establishment clause reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. 
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
3. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). 
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
479 
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birth control law that the Court was striking down reflected reli-
gious orthodoxy. Ii This silence is dishonest and unfortunate. I ar-
gue in this essay that the religious aura that hangs over the issue 
ought not to be ignored.s My thesis is that there is a difference 
between cultural values and religious values and that only the 
former may legitimately underlie legislative action. I suggest ad-
ditionally that the Court's attention in Roe to the issue of viabil-
ity can be understood as an implicit recognition of the validity 
of my claim.7 
Although the Court's opinion in Roe has been subjected to 
substantial criticism,8 with its attention to the issue of viability 
5. Justice Harlan, however, in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 
(1961), did not blink at - indeed he emphasized - this reality. Poe, 367 U.S. at 546-47 
n.12, 554 n.15 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
6. The place for this to begin is in litigation brought against legislation that restricts 
access to abortions. Challenges to religiously motivated laws must emphasize the extent 
to which they are religiously motivated. Ecclesiastical organizations have not been the 
least bit shy about acknowledging the authority for their position. See, e.g., Statement of 
the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, at 10, col. 1 
(national ed.) ("No Catholic can responsibly take a 'pro-choice' stand when the 'choice' 
in question involves abortion." While expressing "anguish [for) women who face issues in 
a way that [they) never will," the Bishops reaffirmed "the church's teaching that all 
human life begins at conception."). 
It is, of course, somewhat difficult to establish that legislation is religious, or that the 
pro-life movement is a religious movement. See infra notes 67-82 and accompanying 
text. In this essay I argue that legislation purporting to interfere with the right to obtain 
an abortion prior to fetal viability manifests religious motivation, and I propose a meth-
odology to be employed in distinguishing between religious and cultural values. As sup-
port for the proposition that pro-life/anti-abortion legislation might well reflect religious 
orthodoxy, see, e.g., Note, Abortion Laws, Religious Beliefs, and the First Amendment, 
14 VAL. U.L. REV. 487 (1980); Greenawalt, Religiously Based Premises and Laws Restric-
tiue of Liberty, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 245 [hereinafter Greenawalt, Premises). See also 
Curran, Religion, Law and Public Policy in America, 42 JURIST 14 (1982); Eidsmoe, A 
Biblical View of Abortion, 1983 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 17; Nelson, The Churches 
and Abortion Law Reform, 1983 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 29. None of these articles, 
it should be added, concludes that anti-abortion legislation is necessarily impermissible 
even if it were demonstrable that the legislation does emerge from religious beliefs. See 
infra note 11. . 
After substantially completing this essay, I came across two recent articles that ex-
plicitly argue that statutes defining life as beginning at conception (as did the statute at 
issue in the Webster case) do violate the establishment clause. See Maddox & Bortnick, 
Do Legislatiue Declarations that Life Begins at Conception Violate the Establishment 
Clause?, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1 (1989); Comment, An Establishment Clause Analysis of 
Webster u. Reproductiue Seruices, 24 GA. L. REV. 399 (1990). 
7. The basic skeleton of the argument I propose in this essay appeared as Court 
Starting to Cater to Zealots on Abortion, Houston Chron., July 4, 1989, at A23. 
8. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). Roe has also 
had its defenders. See, e.g., Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees, 53 B.U.L. 
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coming under attack as an egregious instance of judiciallegisla-
tion,9 any constitutional discussion of the abortion issue must 
begin with Roe itself. I do not propose to defend the jurispru-
dential analysis in Roe. Instead, my aim is to suggest that the 
majority's historical survey of the significance attributed by our 
culture to the moment of viability adumbrates the distinction 
between cultural and religious values that I propose in this es-
say. My argument proceeds as follows. Part I of this essay out-
lines the holding as well as the structure of the opinion in Roe v. 
Wade. Part II summarizes the weakness of any choice argument 
that rests entirely on the right to privacy. Finally, Part III iden-
tifies a major gap in fourteenth amendment jurisprudence and 
sketches an argument for choice1o based on the establishment 
clause of the first amendment.ll 
Initially, however, it will be salutary to review the require-
ments of the establishment clause. The establishment clause 
comprises the opening words of the first amendment, which 
read: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
REV. 765 (1973); Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life 
and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973) (suggesting alternative rationale for holding in Roe, 
one linked to who should have decision making authority). Professor Tribe has since al-
tered his views somewhat. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1302-1435 (2d 
ed. 1988); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975); Tribe, 
Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Presumptions, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 8 (1975). 
9. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 8, at 926-27; Roe, 410 U.S. at 171-72 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
10. What I mean by choice is that the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy 
ought to belong to the woman who is pregnant. 
11. Establishment clause analysis of the abortion issue has attracted only scant in-
terest. In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980), for example, the Court, in less 
than one page, rejected an establishment clause challenge to a statute precluding the use 
of Medicaid monies to fund abortions. See also Women's Servs. v. Thone, 636 F.2d 206 
(8th Cir. 1980), vacated, 452 U.S. 911 (1981); Crossen v. Attorney Gen. of Ky., 344 F. 
Supp. 587 (E.D. Ky. 1972), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Rodgers v. Danforth, 486 
S.W.2d 258 (Mo. 1972); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 165 N.J. Super. 443, 398 A.2d 587 
(1979). 
On the other hand, Justice Stevens' opinion in the Webster case does apply estab-
lishment clause analysis. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3079 (arguing that there is no secular 
purpose for portions of the Missouri statute). See also Greenawalt, Premises, supra note 
6, at 253 (arguing that "because rational secular morality is incapable of answering criti-
cal questions about abortion, liberal citizens properly rely on nonrational premises, in-
cluding religious premises, in developing their positions"); Greenawalt, Religious Convic-
tions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352 (1985); Note, supra note 6 (arguing that 
religiously motivated laws do not violate the first amendment). 
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of religion .... " It has been held to apply to the states through 
the fourteenth amendment.12 
The Court's decision in Everson v. Board of Education13 
was its first attempt at delineating the constitutional content of 
_ the religion clauses. H In it, Justice Black's opinion for the Court 
utilized Jefferson's metaphor of a wall between church and state 
and iterated that it is the role of the Court to keep that wall 
"high and impregnable. "UI The establishment clause forbids the 
government not merely from setting up a church, but also from 
passing laws "which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer 
one religion over another."16 Since 1971, the Court has used the 
so-called Lemon17 test to ascertain whether a challenged action 
runs afoul of the establishment clause. To survive establishment 
clause scrutiny, the act must have a secular legislative purpose; 
its principal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit 
religion; and it must not foster an excessive government entan-
glement with religion. 18 
The Court's use of history in establishment clause cases has 
come under attack from various fronts,19 as has its commitment 
12. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
13. Id. 
14. In addition to the establishment clause, the first amendment also includes the 
free exercise clause, which requires that Congress make no law prohibiting the free exer-
cise of religion. 
15. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. It merits emphasis that the program challenged in Ev-
erson, a New Jersey statute that authorized reimbursement to parents for costs incurred 
in transporting their children to parochial schools, was upheld by the Supreme Court 
against an establishment clause challenge. The wall between church and state, Justice 
Black wrote, was not breached by New Jersey's action. Id. The issue of school funding is 
perhaps the single most intractable strand of establishment clause jurisprudence. For a 
powerful rejection of the Court's conclusion in Everson, see Buchanan, Governmental 
Aid to Sectarian Institutions, 15 Hous. L. REV. 783 (1978). Professor Buchanan, follow-
ing the analysis proposed in his earlier article, has also criticized the Court's recent deci-
sions in the school funding area. See Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Religious Entities: 
The Total Subsidy Position Prevails, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 53 (1989). 
16. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. 
17. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
18. Id. at 612-13. I have elsewhere argued that the two predominant values reflected 
in Lemon, and establishment clause jurisprudence generally, are the non-coercion princi-
ple and the neutrality principle. Dow, Toward a Theory of the Establishment Clause, 56 
UMKC L. REV. 491 (1988). 
19. See, e.g., M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965); T. CURRY, THE 
FIRST FREEDOMS (1986); L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE (1986). 
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to the Lemon test. 20 Nevertheless, it is safe to say that under 
virtually any acceptable construction of the establishment 
clause, the government would be forbidden from passing a law 
where the purpose or reason for enacting the law is to further a 
particular religion or religious belief.n This, indeed, is precisely 
why, in Edwards v. Aguillard,22 the Court struck down a Louisi-, 
ana law that forbade the teaching of evolution in public schools 
unless accompanied by the teaching of creation science.23 With 
this minimalist understanding of the establishment clause in 
place, we can turn to the abortion controversy. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF ROE v. WADE 
Roe v. Wade held that during the first trimester of the preg-
nancy, the state may not regulate abortion. During the second 
trimester, the state may impose regulations reasonably related 
to maternal health. States may outlaw abortion during the third 
trimester of pregnancy, except where the mother's health would 
be threatened.24 The premise in Roe was that the fetus becomes 
viable at or around the beginning of the third trimester.21i The 
implication of the trimester analysis is that once the fetus is via-
ble it comes to possess fundamental constitutional rights, and 
the state has a compelling interest in safeguarding the funda-
mental rights of an entity, like the fetus, that is impotent to 
safeguard its own.26 
20. See especially Justice O'Connor's opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 
(1984); see also Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (White, J., 
concurring); Note, The Supreme Court, Effect Inquiry, and Aid to Parochial Education, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 219 (1985). 
21. This statement requires inquiry into legislative motive, which is concededly 
problematic. See infra notes 66-82 and accompanying text. 
22. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
23. The decision was seven to two, with Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, dissenting. The dissent did not reject the idea that motive alone may be suffi-
cient to invalidate a law, but argued instead that constitutionally impermissible motive 
was not established. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
24. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65. 
25. The Court in Roe explained that viability ordinarily occurs at around the 28th 
week of pregnancy, though it may occur as early as the 24th. Id. In Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), the Court upheld a Missouri statute that re-
quires that a doctor determine whether the fetus is viable for all abortions sought to be 
performed after the 20th week of pregnancy. The Court appears to have double-counted 
the four-week margin of error. Id. at 3055. 
26. Alternatively, the significance of viability might lie in the fact that it is that 
moment when the fetus acquires any rights at all, not necessarily fundamental rights. 
This alternative interpretation of the import of the moment of viability seems to me 
5
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John Hart Ely's early comment on Roe succinctly summa-
rized the seven steps of Justice Blackmun's argument for the 
Court.n Distilled somewhat, the steps are as follows: (1) The 
Constitution includes the right to privacy; (2) this right encom-
passes the woman's decision whether to terminate her preg-
nancy; (3) since the abortion right (as an aspect of the privacy 
right) is fundamental, it is permissible to infringe upon it only 
when the state's interest is compelling; (4) the state's two inter-
ests - protecting life or potential life and protecting maternal 
health - are legitimate from the outset but not compelling until 
later; (5) hence, ·during the first trimester the state cannot inter-
fere at all with the woman's right; (6) but, since the health risks 
of abortion increase during the second trimester, the state's in-
terest in maternal health becomes compelling at this point, so 
the state may enforce regulations that are reasonably related to 
maternal health; (7) then, once the fetus becomes viable, the 
state's interest in its health is compelling, so the state may fur-
ther regulate, even prohibit, abortion, except where abortion is 
necessary to protect the mother's health. (This final "except" 
clause seems, as Professor Ely indicates, perplexing.)28 
If one disagrees with the first step of Justice Blackmun's 
argument - if one believes, as do Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, 
for example29 - that the Constitution does not include a right 
to privacy, then the edifice collapses at the very outset. If one 
accepts the first step of Justice Blackm)..ln's argument but rejects 
the notion that the right to privacy touches at all on the decision 
whether to terminate one's pregnancy, then anti-abortion legis-
lation is not constitutionally problematic despite the existence 
of the privacy right. If one accepts the first two prongs of 
Blackmun's argument, then and only then does the issue become 
intractable. 
unsatisfactory since it is difficult to imagine that the right to life can be anything short 
of fundamental. Moreover, the fact that the fetus' right is fundamental does not invaria-
bly prohibit any abortion if it is conceded that the woman too has a fundamental right. 
27. Ely, supra note 8. 
28. See id. at 920-21 & n.19. In fact, this aspect of the holding is not necessarily 
perplexing if there are competing fundamental rights. See infra notes 41-45. 
29. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3046 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 3064 (Scalia, 
J., concurring). 
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II. THE INCOHERENCE OF THE ARGUMENT BASED ON 
PRIVACY30 
Even if one does believe that the Constitution protects the 
right to privacy, the fact remains that additional analysis must 
be undertaken if the woman's right to choice is to be deemed 
constitutionally protected. The arguments for choice that have 
heretofore been offered neglect this analysis.31 Hence, when Pro-
fessor Ely called Roe "a very bad decision," one that "lacks even 
colorable support in constitutional text, history, or any other ap-
propriate source of constitutional doctrine,"32 his focus, as the 
delineation of Justice Blackmun's argument makes clear, was 
the privacy analysis.33 What Professor Ely is unable to fathom 
about Roe, and what he criticizes cogently, is the striking fact 
that the Court seems to have stopped working once it located 
the woman's right in the penumbra of the fourteenth amend-
ment.54 That was a peculiar place to stop working since, as Ely 
reminds us, locating the woman's right is but the first step of the 
analysis. Next that right must be scrutinized ih the light of and 
balanced against the state's objective for interfering with it. 
" '[D]ue process' generally guarantees only that the inhibition be 
procedurally fair and that it have some 'rational' connection ... 
30. An argument I do not touch on in this essay is that which asserts that laws that 
interfere with abortion in effect force women into slavery. This argument can be 
grounded in equal protection doctrine, by focusing on the fact that pregnancy is a gender 
specific condition, cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); or it can be tethered to the 
premise that we prevent people from entering into involuntary servitude, even if t!:tey 
were to do so with full volition, cf. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 
YALE L.J. 763, 774-80 (1983). For reasons not pertinent to this essay, I am not persuaded 
by either of these claims (nor am I persuaded by the equal protection argument). Per-
haps the most cogent elaboration of the slavery argument is Regan, Rewriting Roe v. 
Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979). 
31. See generally THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABORTION (M. Cohen, T. Nagel, & T. 
Scanlon eds. 1974); ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (J. Garfield & P. Hennes-
sey eds. 1984); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984). 
See also Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159. 
See also supra note 8. 
32. Ely, supra note 8, at 947, 943, 
33. See id. at 935-36. Professor Ely concedes that the woman has a liberty interest 
in controlling her body, which thus encompasses the abortion decision. He complains 
about the degree of protection afforded this interest, particularly since the "super-pro-
tected right is not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers' thinking 
respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the provisions 
they included, or the nation's governmental structure" (citation omitted). 
34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
7
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[to] a permissible governmental goal."SIi As Ely's criticism indi-
cates, even if the first two steps of Justice Blackmun's argument 
were uncontroversial, a balancing test would still be called for. 
Yet the opinion in Roe does not expressly do this balancing; it 
does not explicate the reason(s) why the woman's right triumphs 
during trimesters one and two. 
This criticism is somewhat overstated, for Justice Black-
mun's opinion does recite the accepted mode of analysis. After 
concluding that the abortion decision is within the ambit of the 
right to privacy, Justice Blackmun acknowledged "that this 
right is not unqualified and must be considered against impor-
tant state interests. "S6 What the opinion does not do is explain 
how the balancing procedure in the context of the privacy right 
is accomplished. 
Perhaps the weakness inheres in the way the privacy right is 
characterized. The privacy right is often said to consist elemen-
tally of the right to control one's body.s7 That statement is obvi-
ously too broad. Laws forbidding drug use, laws requiring use of 
seatbelts, and laws prohibiting prostitution all represent sub-
stantial intrusions upon an individual's power to treat his or her 
body as he or she wishes. States may well have compelling inter-
ests in passing and enforcing these restrictions, yet this demon-
strates precisely how the issue is to be analyzed even once the 
existence of a privacy right is conceded.ss More important, un-
less one is willing to conclude that laws against suicide and pros-
titution, for example, are unconstitutional, then it is clear that 
35. Ely, supra note 8, at 935. Of course, if the woman's right is fundamental, the 
state's interest must be compelling, not merely permissible. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965) (opinion of Goldberg, J.); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Like Ronald Mann, I am left uneasy by the invo-
cation of these adjectives as talismanic, but for the moment, I see no way around it. See 
Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985). 
36. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
37. See id. at 152-53. See generally Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 737 (1989). Alternatively, the right might be characterized as the right to control 
one's reproductive functions. This seems unsatisfying for at least two reasons. First, ex-
cept for cases of rape, incest, and failed contraception, one can rather easily imagine a 
"waiver" argument. Second, the choice of level of generality seems extraordinarily (and 
inexplicably) niggardly. 
38. Laws against suicide, which are prevalent in most jurisdictions, are perhaps the 
most remarkable example of interference with individual autonomy. Moreover, it is espe-
cially difficult to articulate a compelling state interest for these laws. Further, laws 
prohibiting suicide are particularly significant in this context because they may well be 
8
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many intrusive interests ostensibly satisfy the appellation "com-
pelling." (The argument that all these laws are illegitimate has a 
great deal of appeal to me as a philosophical proposition, but as 
a doctrinal matter, it is wildly implausible.)39 
The choice argument that rests on the right to privacy is 
thus incoherent, not because the existence of the right to privacy 
is contested, but rather because even once its existence is ac-
knowledged, we must still deal with the issue of which interests 
the state is permitted to weigh against it and which outweigh it. 
Simply put, the state's interest in outlawing abortion, however 
one chooses to articulate it,40 may be as compelling as the inter-
ests in outlawing suicide or prostitution.41 The choice argument 
based on privacy turns out to be not an argument at all, but 
simply the first step of the analysis; and the Court has not indi-
cated how the latter steps are to be accomplished. 
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ARGUMENT FOR 
CHOICE 
Balancing privacy rights against asserted state interests is a 
jurisprudential morass. It seemingly demands that judges act in 
a manner akin to legislators. My claim is that the quagmire can 
driven by orthodox religiosity. They trace their roots unmistakably to prohibitions in 
Jewish law against suicide and self-mutilation. See J. Caro, SHULCHAN ARUCH, Yoreh 
De'ah 345 (suicide), SHULCHAN ARUCH, Hoshen Mishpat 420:31 (self-mutilation). The ba-
sis for these laws is that one's body belongs to God. See Maimonides, MISNEH TORuH, 
Hilchot Rotseah 1:4. One can plausibly argue that these laws, whatever their origins, 
have acquired secular content irrespective of any residual religious aura. Cf, McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 451-52 (1961) (noting that Sunday closing laws have acquired 
secular content). 
39. Even if these laws infringed upon the privacy right, it would not follow that 
anti-abortion legislation is also infirm because the state's interest in that context is ar-
guably quite strong. Cf, Ely, supra note 8, at 935. 
40. The interest might be in maternal health, in fetal life, in potential human life, 
etc. 
41. See supra note 38. Furthermore, in addition to its interest in protecting human 
life, the state might also choose to advance traditionally venerated interests in regulating 
medicine. When the state's action appears to reach dramatically beyond its proffered 
interests, then we might be tempted to conclude that the state has betrayed an illegiti-
mate motivation. Yet some motivations are not illegitimate, and it is these that can 
properly be used to counterbalance the woman's privacy right. 
9
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perhaps be avoided altogether once it is recognized that the as-
serted state interest in the abortion context IS wholly 
illegitimate. '2 
Three different descriptions of the legal rights and interests 
implicated in the abortion context are plausible. Each triggers a 
different level of analysis. (1) If there is no right to privacy, or if 
there is such a right but if the right does not encompass the 
abortion decision, then the state may interfere rather freely; its 
interest need not be compelling. (This statement of the problem 
rejects either or both of the first two steps in Justice Blackmun's 
argument in Roe.) (2) If there is a privacy right, which is funda-
mental, and if the privacy right includes the abortion decision, 
then the state may interfere only if its interest is compelling!3 
(3) If the woman has a fundamental right, and if at some point 
during the pregnancy the fetus acquires a fundamental right as 
well (i.e., either a right to life, or a right to potential life)," then 
42. Even if the quagmire is altogether unavoidable, the fact is that judges are forced 
to act as do legislators in a myriad of contexts. When applying the rational relation test 
in the substantive due process area, for example, judges will sometimes scrutinize the 
reasons why the legislature said it acted, see, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J., looking to purposes articulated by the state 
rather than to hypothetical or conceivable purposes); but just as often the judges will 
search their own minds for possible reasons to support the legislation, see, e.g., Lindsley 
v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(1973). When they do this, the Justices are being legislators. Even in the procedural due 
process context, the Court must act as does a legislature insofar as it must balance vari-
ous interests against one another. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). 
At this point of my argument, I should emphasize that I make certain assumptions 
that are central to my thesis, although, as will become apparent, a rejection of any of my 
assumptions will not necessarily entail a rejection of the establishment clause argument I 
outline. I assume the existence of a constitutional right to privacy (though things would 
certainly be easier if there were a constitutional amendment explicitly recognizing this 
right). I further assume that at some point during the pregnancy the fetus acquires con-
stitutional rights that are fundamental. I thus assume that at some point in the preg-
nancy there arise competing fundamental constitutional rights. Nevertheless, it merits 
emphasis that my argument would cast doubt upon the constitutionality of abortion leg-
islation even if it were true that the Constitution recognizes no right to privacy. 
43. See supra note 35. See also Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 
U.S. 416 (1983). I assume for purposes of this essay that there is no persuasive way of 
characterizing the woman's right as a non-fundamental right. If the right were non-fun-
damental, however, the state would be permitted to interfere even if its interest were less 
than compelling. 
44. The fetus' rights need not be characterized as fundamental in order for a conflict 
to arise. See supra note 26. 
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competing constitutional rights are implicated, and this tension 
must be resolved.411 
The Court, in Roe v. Wade and since,46 has rejected the first 
description of the problem. If that description were adopted, 
then the abortion issue would be largely political,47 although 
even under those circumstances aspects of the argument 
s~etched in this section would remain relevant. In addition, in 
Roe and since, the Court has suggested that both the second and 
third descriptions of the context are proper.4s The Court has 
45. An entirely different essay could be written on abortion focusing on the subject 
of which institution may intervene when fundamental rights are in conflict. Since rights 
belong to persons, individuals will periodically hold rights that are in conflict with rights 
held by others. To say that constitutional rights are in tension is to say that when one 
individual acts in a way presumably permissible under the Constitution, another individ-
ual's supposed constitutional guarantee is interfered with. Who may intervene? 
One answer is to say that the problem is entirely political, and that the political 
processes may balance the competing rights. The political processes (by which 1 mean 
legislatures) could decline to do so and opt instead to let the chips lie where they fall. A 
second answer is that only the courts may balance the rights and resolve (or mitigate) 
the tension. The final answer is that either institution may do so. 
It seems inefficient as well as unwise to say that no institution may act to rectify 
tension between competing rights until the remedy stage of litigation. It thus seems ap-
propriate to permit legislative action. (I have suggested, however, that in the context of 
the religion clauses, there are instances where the state may not act in advance of litiga-
tion. See Dow, supra note 18, at 508-10.) 1 would propose that while the state may act to 
balance competing fundamental rights when such rights are in conflict, it need not act; 
the state may instead let the chips lie where they fall (meaning, if litigation ensues, that 
the courts will be called upon to resolve the issue). Further, when a state does choose to 
act, it may be constitutionally required to do so in a way that produces a pareto-optimal 
result. "A Pareto-superior transaction is one that makes at least one person in the world 
better off and no one worse off." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 12 (3d 
ed. 1986). Consequently, it could extinguish a right entirely only when there is no other 
way to preserve the competing right. Furthermore, state action is obviously cabined by 
the Constitution. See Dow, supra note 18, at 509 & n.66. 
This specter of competing rights is ordinarily associated with the race context, where 
to recognize a black's fourteenth amendment rights appears, at times, to truncate the 
rights of innocent whites. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 
(1989); Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 
U.S. 561 (1984). Paul Gewirtz has addressed the issue of how a court ought to operate 
under such circumstances. See Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 
(1983). Professor Gewirtz distinguishes "rights maximizing" from "interest balancing." 
[d. at 591. His discussion assumes that resolving the tension is a judicial function; he 
does not discuss whether the political process is qualified to participate, and if so, what 
constraints apply. 
46. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312-13 (1980). 
47. By which 1 mean that the problem would be primarily suited to resolution by 
the political process, i.e., the legislatures. But see infra note 72. 
48. See, e.g., Akron, 462 U.S. at 426-31; Harris, 448 U.S. at 312-18. 
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nevertheless neglected to address a crucial issue pertaining to 
those descriptions. 
Specifically, the notion of "compelling state interest" is not 
accompanied by any mechanism for ascertaining whether an as-
serted interest is compelling. This is a stunning doctrinal la-
cuna.49 Although there is rather substantial jurisprudential dis-
cussion of how the Court is to determine whether a right is 
fundamental,IIO the Supreme Court has never so much as inti-
mated what procedure is to be followed in determining which 
adjective to apply to the state's asserted interest. Doctrine, in 
other words, does not explain how a compelling interest is to be 
distinguished from an interest that is merely important, or even 
how a legitimate interest is to be distinguished from one that is 
illegitimate. 
It is uncontroversial, however, that the enterprise of deter-
mining whether a state interest is compelling - whether it per-
mits the state to interfere with an individual's fundamental con-
stitutional right - is a judicial function. lIl I would suggest that 
the appropriate procedure for determining whether an interest 
is "compelling" is to replicate the procedure used to determine 
whether a right is fundamental. 
49. See Viand is v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 460-62 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (re-
ferring to "the elusive and arbitrary 'compelling state interest' concept"). In his dissent-
ing opinion in Roe, Justice Rehnquist opined that by utilizing the "compelling state in-
terest" test in a due process context (as distinguished from an equal protection case) the 
Supreme Court was returning to the discredited Lochner mode of adjudication since "the 
adoption of the compelling state interest standard will inevitably require this Court to 
examine the legislative policies and pass on the wisdom of these policies in the very 
process of deciding whether a particular state interest put forward mayor may not be 
'compelling.' " Roe, 410 U.S. at 174. See generally Schneider, State Interest Analysis in 
the Fourteenth Amendment Privacy Law, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 82-96 (1988). 
50. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S .. Ct. 2333 (1989). In a recent article, 
Professors Farber and Nowak assert that the opinions in Michael H. illustrate "the de-
gree of judicial consensus" on the question of whether unwritten fundamental rights ex-
ist. I believe that their view is unduly sanguine, and my argument in this section does 
not assume that these jurisprudential questions are largely resolved. Farber & Nowak, 
Beyond the Roe Debate: Judicial Experience With the 1980's "Reasonableness" Test, 
76 VA. L. REV. 519, 534 (1990). 
51. If the woman does have a fundamental constitutional right, which is the first 
issue for the Court to determine, then the Court must ascertain whether the state's inter-
est is compelling. There is thus nothing inherently anomalous in the conclusion that at 
some point in the pregnancy, but not before that point, the state's interest is compelling. 
The question that has seemed problematic is whether there is a legitimate way for the 
judiciary to locate that point. 
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The Court is routinely called upon to determine whether a 
right is fundamental, and even whether a right exists.tl2 In Roe, 
for instance, the Court concluded that the meaning of "liberty" 
in the fourteenth amendment includes the right of the woman to 
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.tl3 How the Court is 
to determine whether rights exist, and whether those that do are 
fundamental, is among the most debated issues in constitutional 
theory,tl4 yet not a single member of the Court would dispute 
that the task must be done. 
In fact, the Court's recent decision in Michael H. u. Gerald 
D. tItI affirms this point while illustrating competing methodolo-
gies for determining whether a right is fundamental. The case 
involved the question of who would have custody r~ghts to a 
young girl, the biological father or the spouse of the biological 
52. Determining whether rights are fundamental, and whether an individual holds a 
fundamental right, is acknowledged to be a judicial function. See, e.g., Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Camden, 465 U.S. 
208 (1984); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-94 (1965) (opinion of Goldberg, 
J.); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (opinion of Harlan, J.). This fact alone may 
be all that is needed to justify the Court's inquiry into viability, for insofar as it is the 
proper province of the Court to determine whether a right is fundamental, then, to the 
extent that the issue of viability is connected to that determination, the examination of 
viability is not merely permissible but obligatory .. 
Relatedly, the question of who is a "person" for constitutional purposes is a judicial 
function since it is appurtenant to the judicial task of determining whether a particular 
individual has certain rights. This enterprise is routinely engaged in when the Court 
confronts questions of standing. See Dow, Standing and Rights, 36 EMORY L.J. 1195 
(1987). In addition, and importantly, the question of who is a "person" is quite different 
from the question of what is human, what is sentient, etc. For while the question of what 
is human is partly scientific, partly philosophical, and partly theological, the question of 
what is a person is entirely legal. The Court may well decide that it will permit the states 
to define "person." See supra note 45. Nevertheless, the legislative action will be con-
strained by the Constitution, so that, for example, it may not use a definition that -re-
flects orthodox religion. 
This argument has an analogue in the conscientious objector laws. Congress defines 
"religion" - a first amendment word - for purposes of the exemption, but it may not 
do so in a way that contravenes the establishment clause. See Gillette v. United States, 
401 U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1969). This point is discussed 
in Dow, supra note 18, at 499-500. This is significant in the abortion context precisely 
because I suggest that there is an establishment clause limit on how broadly the state 
may define "person" if the state is indeed permitted to do so at all. 
The theme I want to focus on at present, however, is the question of how the Court 
is to determine whether a proffered state interest is compelling. 
53. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. . 
54. See supra note 52. See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 516, 528-32 
(11th ed. 1985) ("What are the proper sources of 'fundamental values'?"). See also Dow, 
Hillel's Dilemma and Wisdom,4 NAT'L JEWISH L. REV. 59 (1989). 
55. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989). See supra note 50. 
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mother. Under California law, a child born to a married woman 
living with her husband is presumed to be a child of the mar-
riage. The plaintiff, the girl's biological father, challenged this 
presumption as it affected his custody rights, arguing that it 
abridged his fourteenth amendment guarantees. In affirming the 
constitutionality of the statute, Justice Scalia, writing for a plu-
rality, reviewed the Court's practice of looking to "historical tra-
ditions" in determining what is protected by the vague language 
of the fourteenth amendment. Notably, he referred to Roe as 
support for the proposition that societal tradition is critical to 
understanding the liberty protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment. "[W]e spent about a fifth of our opinion [in Roe]," Justice 
Scalia calculated, "negating the proposition that there was a 
longstanding tradition of laws proscribing abortion." For Justice 
Scalia, the Court gives content to the idea of liberty by examin-
ing societal traditions.~6 
Justice Brennan rejected the notion that the sole guide to 
the content of the idea of liberty in the fourteenth amendment 
is what specific societal tradition endorses.~7 A narrow focus on 
highly specific tradition will, argued Justice Brennan, transform 
the Constitution into a "stagnant, archaic, hidebound document 
steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long past." 
The better approach "is to ask whether the . . . relationship 
under consideration is close enough to the interests that we al-
ready have protected to be deemed an aspect of 'liberty' as 
well."~8 Justice Brennan also looked to history, but to a some-
what different history: the history of our cultural values' 
evolution. 
Superficially Justices Scalia and Brennan appear to have lit-
tle in common. Yet both do look to the past, albeit to rather 
56. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with Scalia's idea that the judicial role is to 
locate the most "specific tradition" available rather than a more general one. Justice 
Scalia's preference for a more specific tradition is based on his belief that "general tradi-
tions provide such imprecise guidance [that) they permit judges to dictate rather than 
discern society's views." [d. at 2344 n.6. 
57. Justice Brennan recognized that the Court must determine whether the Consti-
tution recognizes the state's asserted interest, but, as is typical of fourteenth amendment 
jurisprudence, none of the Justices gives any guidance as to how the Court is to classify 
an interest (how the Court is to discriminate among compelling, important, or merely 
legitimate interests). 
58. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2349. Brennan's argument is not unlike that proposed 
by Professor Tribe, see Tribe, Structural Due Process, supra note 8. 
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different segments of the past. Justice Scalia asks what the peo-
ple have in the past regarded as within the ambit of vague con-
stitutional language; Justice Brennan asks what the Court has 
viewed as within the language. Notably, however, neither Justice 
disagrees with the proposition that, irrespective of which aspect 
of history provides the appropriate guide, it is the Court's job to 
do the looking. Furthermore, though they do not agree on what 
it is that should constrain the Court's examination of history, 
both Justices Brennan and Scalia do agree that there must be 
constraints. 
The problem with Roe, therefore, is not simply that the 
Court found a privacy right, or even that the Court misweighed 
it (misjudged, in other words, the applicable constraints). In-
stead, what has bothered commentators and the more conserva-
tive members of the Court about Roe was its peculiar reliance on 
the notion of viability - not its mode of locating fundamental 
rights. The Court's determination of when the fetus' rights be-
come fundamental and of when the state's interest becomes 
compelling rested entirely on the notion of viability, yet the 
Court did not explain why it is that viability matters for consti-
tutional purposes, why it is that the notion of viability can do so 
much work. That omission is responsible for a great deal of the 
legal criticism of the Roe opinion; yet in that silence resides the 
core of the establishment clause argument for choice. 
The establishment clause commands that the government 
"shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion 
•••• "119 The first amendment thus limits the societal traditions 
that can be given constitutional weight. What this means, to ei-
ther the Justice Brennan model or that of Justice Scalia, is that 
if we find, when we look, that our conception of the fourteenth 
amendment is animated primarily by an idea associated with or-
thodox religiosity, then we are compelled by the establishment 
clause of the first amendment to revise our conception. (I as-
sume, without arguing, that the fourteenth amendment cannot 
plausibly be construed to mitigate the force of the establishment 
clause.) 
59. u.s. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. On its own terms, the establishment clause applies 
only to Congress. It was held to apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment 
in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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If the question of whether an asserted state interest is com-
pelling is addressed as is the question of whether an asserted 
right is fundamental (or even existent), as I have suggested it 
ought to be, then it follows that interests rooted in orthodox re-
ligiosity are not even legitimate, and certainly not compelling.60 
This is so simply because the Constitution makes certain reasons 
illegitimate as bases for government action. It is true, of course, 
that the question of legislative motivation is enormously prob-
lematic,61 and in some areas the Court has explicitly dismissed 
the relevance of Congressional motive.62 In the area of the reli-
gion clauses,63 however, motive is recognized as important.6' One 
prong of the Lemon test,611 for example, which is traditionally 
utilized by the Court in establishment clause challenges, in-
quires precisely into the purpose of the challenged action. This 
is proper, I think, because the very nature of religious contro-
versy lies in belief and the attempt to impose orthodoxy. When 
dealing with religious issues, therefore, or issues that are argua-
bly religious, examination of motive, of purpose, is as inevitable 
as it is imperative. 
We are now in a position to appreciate the Court's opinion 
in Roe and its attention to the notion of viability. The critical 
60. The Court has been notoriously disingenuous when confronted with blatantly 
religious laws. In the Sunday closing cases, for example, the Court closed its eyes to 
orthodox religiosity that underlay them. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 
(1961). The Sunday closing cases are discussed in Dow, supra note 18, at 500-01. It is one 
thing to say that if stores could be forced to close on Sundays in 1789 then the establish-
ment clause cannot mean that they must be permitted to remain open; it is quite an-
other to pretend that the laws themselves are not animated by purely religious impulses. 
That certain reasons are constitutionally illegitimate is an uncontroversial feature of 
first amendment doctrine, even though it necessarily incorporates motive analysis. See 
supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text. In the free speech context, see, e.g., Mt. 
Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 
593 (1972). 
61. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of 
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977); Brest, Reflections on Motive 
Review, 15 SAN DEIGO L. REV. 1141 (1978); Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to 
the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legisla-
tive and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). 
See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 
(1977). 
62. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
63. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. 
64. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
65. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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question (assuming the existence of the privacy right) is whether 
the state's interest in preserving either fetal life or potential life 
is compelling. To answer this question, we must look, as we do 
when determining whether the meaning of "liberty" includes a 
certain protection, either to societal tradition (Justice Scalia's 
model) or to the evolution of societal tradition, as that evolution 
has been understood by the courts (Justice Brennan's model). 
Either approach reveals the pertinence of Justice Blackmun's fo-
cus on viability in Roe, for either approach must acknowledge -
the establishment clause compels as much - that societal tradi-
tion must be understood as something different from orthodox 
religious doctrine. Further, irrespective of the meaning· we affix 
to the notion of "societal tradition," it alone, in contradistinc-
tion to religious mores, serves as the sole appropriate guide. To 
ascertain, then, whether the state's interest is compelling, we 
must look to how societal tradition, or the evolution of societal 
tradition, has regarded the state's interest at issue, and we must 
be quite careful to separate societal tradition (or what I prefer to 
denominate cultural value·s) from religious mores. 
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe purports to demonstrate 
that despite the ancient religious view that life begins at concep-
tion and that abortion is therefore sinful, our culture has not 
abided by that view. Our culture - our "societal tradition," in 
Justice Scalia's parlance - does not accept the notion that the 
fetus prior to viability is an entity on whose behalf the state may 
categorically proscribe abortion. The inquiry into viability is 
thus a judicial function - and a critical one at that - because 
it serves to distinguish broad, widely held cultural values from 
discrete religious dogma. And this distinction is necessary to the 
determination of whether a proffered state interest is 
compelling. 
Often the state's interest in enforcing moral or ethical val-
ues does rise to the level of compelling. The morals or ethics 
that the political system seeks to enforce, however, must be 
grounded in cultural values rather than religious values. States 
can outlaw murder, for example, because there is widespread 
(which is not to say unanimous) consensus with the notion, say, 
that Ted Bundy's victims were "persons." On the other hand, 
17
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laws purporting to forbid work on the Sabbath, or laws purport-
ing to compel individuals to keep kosher, would be unconstitu-
tional, for laws such as these surely would reflect primarily reli-
gious values. Cultural values can supply the predicate for a 
compelling state interest.66 Discrete religious dogma cannot. 
This argument requires that we be able to distinguish cul-
tural values (which can legitimately underlie moral or ethical 
legislation) from religious values (which cannot).67 It also re-
quires that we be able to determine when what was once solely a 
religious value has become a cultural value.68 These tasks are 
difficult, although others have suggested how they might be ac-
complished.69 The present point, however, is that there is a dif-
ference (for constitutional purposes) between religious values 
66. Hence, it has been held that mere administrative convenience is not a compel-
ling interest, see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Procedural due process 
must be observed even when it is costly to do so, see e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 656 (1972). This commitment is certainly connected to the deeply held and preva-
lent idea in our culture that efficiency or utility are not important enough values to war-
rant disregard for individual rights. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 190-92 
(1977). 
67. A distinction can also be drawn between cultural and political values. Cultural 
values, I would suggest, might be said to be associated with our essence as a people, 
whereas political values are merely attributes. Political values are far more ephemeral 
than cultural values. Cf. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, bks. I-IV, VI. 
68. Cf. Sunday closing cases cited supra note 60. 
69. E.g., Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards, 83 
YALE L.J. 221 (1973); Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power, 23 
UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976). Governor Cuomo put the point well: 
[P]ublic morality ... depends on a consensus view of right 
and wrong. The values derived from religious belief ... should 
not ... be accepted as part of the public morality unless they 
are shared by the pluralistic community at large, by 
consensus. 
Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 
13, 18 (1984) (address to the Department of Theology at the University of Notre Dame, 
September 13, 1984). 
Professor Greenawalt, who has addressed the connection between religious values 
and abortion legislation, see Greenawalt, Premises, supra note 6, at 274, is correct in 
concluding that the moment of viability has no rational connection to the fetus' moral 
worth. That is not the issue, however. The issue is whether the moment of viability is 
culturally significant. Governor Cuomo's instinct is that it is, and Justice Blackmun's 
opinion in Roe suggests that Cuomo's instinct is accurate. See generally, M.A. GLENDON, 
ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987); Robertson, In the Beginning: the Legal 
Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437 (1990). 
The issue of whether the Supreme Court is competent to discern social consensus is 
problematic and widely discussed. See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy, 90 
YALE L.J. 1063, 1068-71, 1083-86 (1981). My present point, however, is simply that there 
is a difference, and a constitutionally significant one, between religious values and other 
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and cultural values, and that only one can provide the predicate 
for a compelling state interest. 
As a preliminary effort to distinguish between them, I would 
suggest that religious values can be recognized by the presence 
of truly radical divisiveness surrounding them. Cultural values 
must perforce be defined tautologically, in terms of the culture 
'whence they emerge, and "[w]hat constitutes a particular cul-
ture is the set of statements that are considered to be 'war-
rantedly assertable' within it."70 This means that our culture 
comprises the beliefs of those to whom we appeal when we ar-
gue. As Wittgenstein put it: 
If I say that my book is meant for only a small 
circle of people (if it can be called a circle), I do 
not mean that I believe this circle to be the elite 
of mankind, but it does comprise those to whom I 
turn (not because they are better or worse than 
others but) because they form my cultural milieu, 
my fellow citizens as it were, in contrast to the 
rest who are foreign to me.71 
social values. C{. K. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICES (1988); 
Audi, Religion and the Ethics of Political Participation, 100 ETHICS 386 (1990). I have 
elsewhere argued that ascertaining non-religious cultural values is indeed a distinctively 
judicial function. Dow, supra note 54. I would argue further that our culture has rather 
deep roots that sanction precisely this resort to judicial instinct, or to what I prefer to 
denominate judicial wisdom. Rousseau's remarks, for instance, are edifying: 
[T]he first concern of those who plot iniquities is to protect 
themselves from juridical proofs; it does not do any good to 
bring them to court. Interior conviction recognizes another 
type of proof which is governed by the feelings of an honest 
man. 
Letter from J. J. Rousseau to David Hume, quoted in C. BLUM, ROUSSEAU AND THE RE-
PUBLIC OF VIRTUE 257 (1986). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton 1788) 
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as 
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning."). 
70. S. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 110 (1982). This 
claim is not unlike Stanley Fish's argument that what makes an interpretation accept-
able is that other interpreters feel obliged to respond to it. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT 
IN THIS CLASS? 344 (1980). Fish's argument is vulnerable, I think, but it might nonethe-
less define the outer limits of a given culture. 
71. L. WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 10e (P. Winch trans. 1980) (German ed. 
1977, published as VERMISCHTE BEMERKINGEN) (emphasis in original). Relatedly (I 
think), Wittgenstein added: "I believe that if one is to enjoy a writer one has to like the 
culture he belongs to as well. If one finds it indifferent or distasteful, one's admiration 
cools off." [d. at 85e (emphasis in original). 
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Controversies animated by competing religious views do not 
partake of the rational discourse ordinarily associated with polit-
ical debate. Although it is obviously not the role of the Court to 
intervene in politics where the issue is merely morally controver-
sial,72 ordinary moral controversy, while often bitter and divi-
sive, typically proceeds at a level of rationality.73 This is not to 
say that religiously held beliefs or values are illegitimate, or that 
they are less worthy of respect than secular beliefs and values; 
indeed, it is not even to say that non-religious beliefs and values 
are ultimately rational, for they are not.H My point is simply 
that only non-religious values can, consistently with the Consti-
tution, underlie legislative action. 
Further, in an argument not dissimilar from mine, Professor 
Richard has put forth the provocative suggestion that the very 
recognition of a right to privacy evinces a principled realization 
of the Constitution's skepticism toward state enforcement "of 
72. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 547 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Politics is 
characterized, I would argue, by compromise. To this extent, the abortion issue, insofar 
as at least one set of the disputants is unwilling to compromise, seems, peculiarly, to lie 
outside the bounds of politics. Because the problem is not compromise-able, it is not a 
political problem. See supra note 47. 
73. See generally F. SCHICK, HAVING REASONS (1984); D. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1989). Again, Wittgenstein's insights are illuminating: 
It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something 
like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, 
although it's belief, it's really a way of living, or a way of as-
sessing life. It's passionately seizing hold of this interpreta-
tion. Instruction in a religious faith, therefore, would have to 
take the form of a portrayal, a description, of that system of 
reference, while at the same time being an appeal to con-
science. And this combination would have to result in the pu-
pil himself, of his own accord, passionately taking hold of the 
system of reference. It would be as though someone were first 
to let me see the hopelessness of my situation and then show 
me the means of rescue until, of my own accord, or not at any 
rate led to it by my instructor, I ran to it and grasped it. 
L. WI'ITGENSTEIN, supra note 71, at 64e (emphasis in original). 
74. Michael Perry has suggested, correctly I think, that the Constitution consists of 
a complex of value judgments that can themselves be called religious. See Perry, 
Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (1981). These 
values signify the way that the people, the American people as a whole, understand 
themselves and their culture. The task of the judiciary is to distill and safeguard these 
values. See supra note 69. These values are not. in a logical sense, less arbitrary than 
religious values. The point, however, is that they are grounded in a distinctly American 
culture, rather than in a discrete religious doctrine. See also Grey, The Constitution as 
Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
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certain conceptions of a perfectionist public morality."711 Follow-
ing William James then, we might define religious values as 
those connected to the "the feelings, acts, and experiences of in-
dividual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend them-
selves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the 
divine."76 James was, of course, defining "religion," not "reli-
gious value"; accordingly, his caveat is particularly appropriate: 
"[T]he word 'religion,'" James warned, "cannot stand for any 
single principle or essence."77 Nevertheless, James' attention to 
the idea of "divine" is suggestive and salutary.78 Mencken's con-
ception of religion was not unlike James': What all religions 
share, in Mencken's view - and this truly distinguishes reli-
gions from cultures - is that they aim "to attract the notice of 
the gods, and ... to induce them to be amiable."79 A value that 
is tethered inextricably to some concept of the divine is a reli-
gious value. Of course, divine inspiration is only a single source 
of morality. Morality can also come, and does come, from ra-
tional inquiry80 and from the repetition of persistent and preva-
lent moral injunctions. These injunctions are generated by a cul-
ture yet are not divine. They are ethereal, almost mystical, 
hurdles that individuals in a given culture "think of as more or 
less insurmountable."81 Aborting viable fetuses would exemplify 
one such hurdle. More generally, in the abortion context, the 
moment of viability represents the boundary between cultural 
75. Richard, Liberalism, Public Morality, and Constitutional Law, 51 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 123, 125 (1988). 
76. W. JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 42 (1961). James' own com-
plex religious views are ably (and accessibly) discussed in G. MYERS, WILLIAM JAMES: HIS 
LIFE AND THOUGHT 446-61 (1986). 
77. W. JAMES, supra note 76, at 39. "The theorizing mind," James added, "tends 
always to the oversimplification of its materials. This is the root of all that absolutism 
and one-sided dogmatism by which both philosophy and religion have been infested." [d. 
78. Here too, however, James was aware that he was on treacherous ground. See id. 
at 43-47. As James conceded, "a chance of controversy comes up over the word 'divine,' 
if we take the definition in too narrow a sense. There are systems of thought which the 
world usually calls religious, and yet which do not positively assume a God. Buddhism is 
in this case." [d. at 43. See also W. JAMES, The Will to Believe, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE 
AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 1-31, especially 30 (Dover ed. 1956; originally 
published 1897) (noting that decisions based on religious values are quintessentially indi-
vidual). I am thankful to Ronald Chichester for calling this passage to my attention. 
79. H.L. MENCKEN, A TREATISE ON THE GODS 101 (1930). See also id. at 101-02 (not-
ing that one of the four ideas lying at the bottom of all religion is the belief that the 
universe is controlled by a supernatural power). 
80. See, e.g., R. HARDIN, MORALITY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON (1988); R.M. HARE, 
ESSAYS IN ETHICAL THEORY (1989). 
81. S. HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND CONFLICT 88 (1983). 
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(or social) consensus and radical divisiveness. Viability is our 
culture's insurmountable hurdle. It, and not the moment of con-
ception, has been vested by our culture with import. Laws 
prohibiting abortions of viable fetuses would thus not be reli-
gious laws (though they would certainly represent a particular 
moral vision); laws that infringe the right to abortion prior to 
fetal viability, on the contrary, would be. 
Laws that simply reflect or implement religious values, or 
laws that are primarily animated by religious values, are imper-
missible under the first amendment.82 While legislatures may 
constitutionally enact laws connected to moral or ethical values, 
the moral or ethical laws that legislatures seek to enforce must 
be grounded in our cultural values rather than in discrete reli-
gious dogma. Laws that outlaw abortion prior to viability reflect 
orthodox religious values rather than cultural values. Such laws 
thus traverse the line between permissible moral legislation and 
forbidden establishment of religion. 
82. This raises problems associated with ascertaining legislative intent. The litera-
ture on this subject is extensive. See, e.g., Symposium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 925 (1978). See also sources cited supra note 61. Despite the problems, the 
inquiry is, as I intimate in the text, imperative where establishment clause challenges are 
levied. In fact, in addressing and resolving the so-called creation-science issue, the Court 
has recently reaffirmed the pertinence of motive analysis in religion cases. See, e.g., Ed-
wards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 
(1985). Furthermore, the purpose prong of the Lemon test, traditionally used in estab-
lishment clause cases, reflects precisely this inquiry into motive. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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